

**Joint Force Headquarters-California
Functional Analysis Team
Read ahead package**

Introduction:

The following information is provided as a read-ahead package for individuals participating in the functional analysis of the California National Guard in preparation for transition to the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). During the initial training session, this information was provided and discussed in the first sessions of the day. Participants in that session suggested that the information be provided as a read-ahead and then only discussed (as opposed to "Taught") to allow the train-up for JFHQ to be accomplished in a single day rather than the day and a half originally scheduled.

The information covers two topic areas and is intended to set the stage and answer some of the concerns for members of the CNG as we begin this historic transformation of the State Headquarters. For each of the key points, you will find attached copies of reports, briefings, memorandums, or other source documents that you can reference to validate the information provided.

You must be comfortable with the validity of the information to prepare for the questions and comments that invariably will come up such as "this, like other initiatives before, will die when (fill in the blank..) retires" or the ever popular "If we just wait a little while, this will be OBE..."

Why Do This?

About every ten years, the Department of Defense reviews changes in technology, threat, and demographic and geo-political factors and updates the strategic direction of the department. This consistent practice of looking over the horizon allows the department to accomplish the necessary adjustments in strategy, doctrine, and tactics to ensure preparedness to meet the missions of the future.

The most recent review resulted in the publication of "Vision 2020" which sets the stage for where the department needs to be to meet the anticipated threat of the next twenty years. This review identified many significant changes over from the previous review

Headline...:

If one were to write a headline to address the strategic and operational changes within Department of Defense, it might well read...

"Department Of Defense Converts To Capabilities Based Decision Making"

Significance:

Many leaders attribute the changes in Joint Vision 2020 to be as significant as the changes of 1945, (the formation of the Department of Defense), 1947 (the formation of the Department of the Air Force), 1968, (the creation of the Joint Chief's of Staff), and for the Army, the Force XXI changes initiated in 1999. Regardless if you attribute the

same significance of joint Vision 2020 as the other major initiatives in the history of the Department of Defense or you consider it a lesser in-stride adjustment in direction, there can be no disagreement that the National Defense landscape for the nation has changed dramatically in the last ten years.

Background:

In establishing the strategic direction of the department, a measured process is undertaken. First, the department develops the vision of what end-state will be. Then, intermediate milestones or processes are identified. Once the department has developed the end-state, and the route (milestones) implementing instructions are developed, and finally the various components then develop their plans to fulfill their portion of the vision. To assist the reader with a "Readers Digest Condensed" version of these three steps, a synopsis of key points is provided. It is important to understand all three elements of the End-state (the vision), The Roadmap (Transformation Guidance) and the Implementing Instructions for our component. Each will be addressed separately.

Capabilities Based Methodologies (Slides 1-3 Attached):

The DoD has begun to build strategies, operational, tactical, and resourcing based on "Capabilities" rather than systems or traditions. In a word, it is not important what we have, but rather what we can do. ***It is not Mass, but rather Effect that is driving the train in current and future resourcing decisions.***

In 1996 the Joint Staff formed a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to develop recommendations on how to develop a "Capabilities Based" force for the future. The JROC was charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and provide the Secretary of Defense a Joint Concept of Operations by March 1, 2003. (NOTE: Selected briefing slides are included in the read-ahead package for reference)

The methodology developed would serve to radically change how the Department of Defense would conduct business. The concept and briefings cover many aspects of how the Department would do business, including:


- How requirements between the services are generated and prioritized
- How Operational concepts for all services are developed using the Defense Planning Guidance (as in the past) but also using Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG)
- A Strong reliance on Joint Integration (*Note the change in terms from Joint Operations*)
- Developed Four (Initial) Joint Operating Concepts which include:
 - Major Combat Operations
 - Stability Operations
 - Homeland Security (now defense)
 - Strategic Deterrence
- Developed functional concepts on how the services would integrate their service specific capabilities and generate new capabilities.

- Established Experimentation as a concept to rapidly generate and test new capabilities
- Introduced Metrics (ability to measure effectiveness) of capabilities (and)
- Proposed a resourcing strategy that amends the current practice of resourcing a service or weapons system to prioritizing resourcing based on generating capabilities in the core competencies of each service. (Figure out what you need, and which service has the core competency, then resource that service for that capability)

For the purposes of the transformation to JFHQ two slides from the entire briefing are included that outlines the change in resource prioritization. The first slide shows the change from resourcing stove-piped systems to resourcing joint capabilities. In the current method of resourcing, each service identifies their own need for equipment, weapons systems, infrastructure, or other resource requirements. Each service specific requirement goes up through their respective channel, and the integration (and prioritization) occurs at the Department level. In the proposed methodology, the department starts with strategic direction, which translates into joint operations concepts where the capabilities are generated either service specific or joint and the capability is resourced where it is most effective.

The second slide provides a graphic representation of how concepts (What, or end-states) are refined into architectures (How, or Methods). Current and Future systems are then assessed, (irrespective of service) to determine which systems provide what capabilities. The capabilities (which are generated by systems) are prioritized and overlaid on the resourcing process, and the highest priority CAPABILITIES are resourced earliest in the POM process.


A critical point to remember is that when considering capabilities based planning, in a resource constrained environment, it is reasonable to expect that redundant systems and non-critical capabilities will be abandoned or phased out in favor of generating additional capabilities that meet the widest possible mission spectrums.



Capabilities-Based Methodology

A Joint Force C2 Example


Proposed Methodology




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Proposed Methodology


Concepts




Architectures




Assessment



Capability Roadmap



Resource Strategy



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The Vision: Joint Vision 2020 (Slides 4-18 Attached)

“Joint Vision 2020” was actually developed prior to 9/11. When viewed through the prism of experience of the last two years, it is clear that JV2020 really reflects the current world situation, but it becomes more valid when one recognizes that this “vision” was developed prior to the attacks of 9/11, before the Global War on Terrorism, and before the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The supporting information for JV2020 is selected slides from the JV2020 briefing by Major General Pete Osman, USMC, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development. A copy of the entire briefing may be requested from the Strategy and Analysis Directorate. Many of the points in this primer are taken directly from the “Notes” in MG Osman’s briefing. The information from these notes will be presented in *italics*. Highlights in the notes are to emphasize key points within the briefing.

*Joint Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 to **guide the continuing transformation** of America’s Armed Forces. The primary purpose of those forces has been and will be to fight and win the Nation’s wars. The **overall goal of the transformation** described in this document is the **creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations** – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.*

Why Change?

The planning factors have changed dramatically in the ten years preceding publication of JV2020. Both Active and Reserve forces had been significantly reduced in size, the requirements placed on those forces had greatly expanded, and like no time in modern history, the Department of Defense was tasked with “doing more with less”. The global environment has likewise changed in the past 10 years (Slide 6), with proliferation of weapons, significant increases in terrorist incidents, the advent of peacekeeping missions, The Advent of Trans-national and Non-State actors, and the instability caused by failed nation-states. Additionally, the quantum increases in reliance on information technologies by the US military and unprecedented access to technology by potential adversaries requires the careful consideration and planning to protect and exploit our technological advantages.

*The 21st Century security environment will be complex and will present numerous challenges to U.S. global interests across a wide spectrum of conflict never experienced before. Challenges confronting a 2020 JTF Commander will cover the **full range of military operations** to include:*

- * **Maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence, theater engagement and overseas presence activities,***
- * **Employment of strategic forces, major theater wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies in response to the proliferation of sophisticated weapons or weapons of mass destruction,* Increased instances of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, noncombat humanitarian relief operations, support to domestic authorities, as well as other ambiguous situations residing between peace and war caused by the rise of transnational threats***

and increased independent international terrorism. Information security will be critical in an information-dependent, information-saturated world. All in all, a much less predictable world than the one known before.

Examples of how we are addressing these include the establishment within the Joint Staff of divisions for Combating Terrorism and Information Operations, the standing JTF-6, and the JTF Joint Guardian currently in Kosovo.

Context (Slide 7):

In updating the vision, the planners developed the strategic context that establishes the framework that must be considered in developing the JV2020 and subsequent Implementation guidance and tactics. They identified three key factors that must be carried across the planning activities:

Three aspects of the 2020 world have significant implications for the US Armed Forces.

*First, the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. **The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.***

*Second, **potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the US military.** We will not necessarily sustain a wide technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas. Our advantage must, therefore, come from improvements to doctrine, organizations, training, leaders, education, and people that enable us to take advantage of technology to achieve superior warfighting effectiveness.*

*Finally, as our capabilities evolve, **we should expect potential adversaries to adapt and make use of asymmetric approaches that avoid US strengths and exploit potential vulnerabilities.** The psychological impact of asymmetric warfare such as attacks against US citizens and territory might far out weigh the actual physical damage inflicted.*

The Goal: Full Spectrum Dominance (Slide 8)

Before an organization can chart a course, they must first determine the end-state, or Goal. MG Osman's notes say it well:

The ultimate goal of our military force is to achieve the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities.

For the joint force of the future, this goal will be accomplished through Full Spectrum Dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any

adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations

The Methodology (Slide 9):

How do we accomplish Full Spectrum Dominance? What are the set pieces for success?

The Foundation for success is interoperability at all levels that uses innovation and information superiority to enable four key Operational tenets:

- Dominant Maneuver,
- Precision Engagement,
- Focused Logistics, and
- Full Dimensional Protection

The Operational Tenets must be Enhanced by four key attributes—

- Interagency and
- Multinational participation and interoperability,
- Joint Command & Control and
- Information Operations

To Develop and maintain full spectrum dominance will require co-evolution of the seven critical considerations. Note the selection of the words co-evolution. This represents an ongoing simultaneous development that continues to grow as the internal and external environments change. The critical considerations include:

- Joint Doctrine,
- Agile Organizations,
- Joint Training,
- Enhanced Materiel,
- Innovative Leadership and Education,
- High Quality People, and
- Requisite Facilities

The synchronization of all these factors (often now seen as the Acronym DOTMLPF) will provide the US Military the ability to dominate the full spectrum from peacetime engagements to full-scale war. (More on the four major cornerstones of full spectrum later)

What is the difference from 2010? (slide 10)

Joint Vision 2020 recognizes the need to prepare for operations that require **more than jointness between services**, it recognizes the need for operational links between agencies and organizations within the US and also between the US and other countries

Joint Vision 2020 adds several additional key attributes of a synergistic force--*Joint Command and Control*, and *Information Operations*.

Peace Operations and other operations on the low end of the conflict spectrum receive greater emphasis in the new Vision document.

Joint Vision 2020 advocates that **innovation in all aspects of military competence** are required to achieve full spectrum dominance, not just innovation in technical areas. **Innovative ways in preparing doctrine, organizing units, and preparing leaders are every bit as important as new technological capabilities** in creating a joint force capable of dominating the 21st century landscape.

Once the planners had developed the goal, and the methodology to achieve that goal, they turned their focus on external factors that would impact on the achievement of the goal. They identified six factors for consideration.

The 21st Century Threat: (slide 11) (Remember, this was developed prior to 9/11)
The 21st century threat differs significantly from the Cold War threat of the past.

- There exists the possibility of a significant disruption to critical US infrastructure. This can be accomplished by destroying or disturbing the infrastructure or by impacting the confidence of the American people with that infrastructure (such as the dramatic drop in airline passengers following 9/11). These attacks may occur coincident with anti-access campaigns and attacks on targets abroad **designed to erode American will**. NOTE: The attacks against Iraqi infrastructure are designed to foster anti-American sentiment and further erode both American will and local support
- Asymmetric attacks (chem/bio/...) could occur simultaneously at numerous locations around the globe thus stressing US assets.
- Selective asymmetric advantage over US capabilities such as through the use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products like Global Positioning Systems or through the use of simple, available everyday products (like fertilizer compounds) to build high explosives deliverable by low tech means.
- **Aggressive Information Operations** and manipulation of media can paint a false picture and turn local or world opinion against US objectives.

The 21st Century Operational Environment; (Slide 12)

The operational environment of the 21st century has grown exponentially. When JV2020 was first developed, these concepts “made sense” but in the few years since it’s development, our experience has shown that these concepts have become certainty.

- The Area of Operations (Army Term A/O) or Area of Responsibility (Air Force Term AOR) is now defined as the “Battlespace”. The battlespace no longer exists solely in the area of conflict, and is not defined by the range of weapons systems, but rather it now extends from the area of conflict back to the homeland both in terms of the threat against the US and in terms of US global reach. This is best exemplified by the combination of peacekeeping, combatant, and homeland security/homeland defense operations simultaneously under way.

- The nature of the battlefield and the way we operate will require high operational tempo with simultaneous and parallel effects from the strategic to the tactical level that will compress the time available for planning, decision making, and execution.
- In order to operate effectively in this fast paced environment, we will require a **truly joint, interoperable military force**. Connectivity between military forces, members of the Interagency, non-governmental organizations (IGOs, NGOs, PVOs), and even individual specialists will allow for information superiority. Information Superiority, in turn, will lead to decision superiority and better operational execution.
- We most recently relearned in operations in Kosovo of the need to better coordinate US military operational efforts across both the Interagency and multinational forces. Integration of both the Interagency and multinational forces will become more common place as we seek unity of effort.
- The Joint Force will be a force able to equally handle all missions across the spectrum of conflict. While we have been confident in our abilities to operate in the high end of the conflict spectrum, MOOTW have shown that we have room for improvement.

“Jointness American Style” (Slide 13)

The requirements of the 21st Century require we re-define “Jointness” and to take the concept of Joint to new, far more broad and coordinated levels. Prior to the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the focus of “Joint Operations” was to primarily de-conflict the operations of the four services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps) The result of this process was generally to constrain use of service capabilities and each service remained primarily in their “stovepipe” . For example, in WWII the services operated within their dimension or zone with minimal cross-over, support or synergy. MG Osman likened this level of “joint” to be like football. In football, there are offensive, defensive and player specific specialists. The offense and defense, each fairly independent of each other, develop plans, sets the play, execute and assess progress toward the goal before taking the next step. The play is deliberate with time for both the offensive and defensive to plan, make decisions and execute those decisions. The pace and tempo are determined by breaks between plays and by the shifting between offense and defense specialists.

In the period following the formation of the JCS, the intent and practice was to stitch together the various services so each service could use their full capabilities without conflicting with the other services. Today, we are capable and focused on the multi-dimensional and service seams for joint service interoperability. We’ve been successful in breaking down and blending operational barriers so forces are more interoperable and more combat effective than ever before. But there is still much work to be done. Like soccer, game-play is more continuous and fluid and players are more multidimensional, able to play both offense and defense. But there are still a few players who have strictly zone or defense responsibilities.

With JV2020, the department of defense must develop a new level of joint interoperability, combat effectiveness, battlefield awareness, and warfighting

dominance. Warfare in this era will be more like basketball where the action is high tempo and continuous, and where there is no luxury of time as the players continually phase between offense and defense each time the play of the game changes directions. This will result in two distinct steps.

First, DoD will be able to optimize both “Service Specific” core competencies and “Joint Specific” capabilities through the integration of the capabilities of each service PLUS any new capabilities that are *(new term coming here...)* “BORN JOINT” capabilities. Those capabilities that did not exist before we integrated two or more service core capabilities.

The follow-on to fully integrating the services is to integrate interagency and multinational capabilities. JV2020 envisions an exponential synergy that starts with integrated service core competencies and grows rapidly with the integration of core competencies from other agencies and nations.

Force Structure for the 21st Century: (Slide 14)

JV 2020 does not directly address force structure decisions, but the ideas and concepts in the document allow us to anticipate the types of force structure changes we might see in the future.

Although in the future we will continue to rely on overseas presence to shape the global environment, those forces may be less robust than today. Therefore, there will be a greater emphasis on projecting power from the continental US in support of US policy abroad.

*The joint force of the future will be a **balanced, rapidly deployable expeditionary force**. This force will be projected in sustained waves of both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that will maximize the core competencies of the Services.*

Reserve forces will be full partners in the nation's MTW response capabilities and will play an increased role in performing SSC missions that are vital to US interests. In addition, the National Guard and Reserve forces are well suited by status, organization, and geographic coverage to serve a key role in providing military support to civil authorities for war-fighting, consequence management, overall Homeland Security, and mitigation of WMD threats and incidents through training in crisis and consequences management.

Capability- The Key Word: (Slide 15)

Throughout the JV2020 terms that defined size such as “Mass” or unit designations (Division, Corps, Wing) have been replaced with “Capability”. A major change in thought process is that we need not respond with a specific number of soldiers, airmen, ships, planes, or tanks, but rather we must be prepared to respond to any given mission with a decisive capability. Capabilities can be leveraged with greater agility, improved

technology, dynamic doctrine, partnering with other agencies or nation-states or other factors that leverage core competencies of our services to achieve the desired end-state. As MG Osman said:

Future forces will certainly be different in structure and make-up than today's forces but may still be thought of as having an equivalent capability.

JV2020 anticipates increased force capability via the leveraging power of interoperability with the interagency and coalition countries in achieving objectives.

Additionally, new dimensions, such as space-based technology, robotics, and nano-technology and non-kinetic engagement may dramatically increase the capability of the 2020 Joint Force over what is available today.

A future equivalent capability might be thought of in terms of the forces required to achieve the desired objectives in a small-scale contingency. While today we might require a 2 Division ground force, a future equivalent force might be lighter and smaller as it leverages on other capabilities.

The result would be a synergistic force in 2020 that is greater than the sum of the individual parts--a force that will confront an operational challenge with multiple overwhelming paths of congruent approach leading to a single political military end state.

Roadmap to joint Vision (Slide 16)

The Joint Vision identifies a series of steps and actions that must be accomplished to reach the desired goal.



- First, all leaders within the DoD must embrace the vision as the common goal, and that shared vision must shape the Defense Planning Guidance.
- Based on the shared vision and DPG, all services must identify challenges and desired operational capabilities to meet future challenges. (NOTE: the use of the word challenges rather than threats.
- Joint Forces Command must build campaign plans, drawing heavily on experimentation, to develop the CAPABILITIES needed to meet future challenges.
- The Department of Defense must develop an implementation master plan, followed by the Unified Command Plan to both identify what success looks like, and who has responsibility for each element of success.
- Once the Department is integrated, the plans and processes to integrate other agencies into the process must be completed. This will open the door for other federal, state, local, and non-governmental agencies to bring CAPABILITIES to the response team.
- Finally, in addition to integrating the agencies addressed above, the Department must also integrate other nations in alliances, coalitions, and bilateral linkages to leverage the CAPABILITIES of partner nations.

NOTE: While these steps are for the most part sequential, the experimentation aspects of Joint Vision 2020 recognizes that many of these steps may be occurring at some level simultaneously.

Joint Vision 2020 Conclusion: (Slide 17)


JV2020 is firmly grounded in the view that the core competencies of the individual services (and ultimately other agencies and nations core competencies) must be brought together to create a truly joint force capable of Full Spectrum Dominance.

The full JV2020 briefing is available on the JFHQ Transformation website, or by contacting Strategy & Analysis Directorate



Joint Vision

2020




Pete Osman
Major General, USMC
Director for Operational Plans
and Joint Force Development

Overview



- **Joint Vision - Why?**
- **Strategic Context**
- **Joint Vision Goal**
- **Difference Between JV2020 and JV2010**
- **Difference Between JV2020 and Today**
- **Moving Toward the Joint Vision**
- **Conclusion**


21st Century Security Environment




Strategic Context




- Continued US Global Interests & Engagement



- Adversary Access To Technology



- Asymmetric Threats Are More Likely



Joint Vision Goal: Full Spectrum Dominance



-- *Full Spectrum Dominance* --


The ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.



JV2020 and Jv2010--What's Different?

- More Focus on Multinational, & Interagency Interoperability

- Information Operations Highlighted As Critical Element of Full Spectrum Dominance




Goals


FRIENDLY	TARGET AUDIENCE	ADVERSARY
- Inform	- Influence	- Influence
- Facilitate		- Degrade
- Protect		- Destroy
		- Deny

- Joint C2 Receives Increased Focus
- Info Superiority Leads To Decision Superiority
- MOOTW Receives Greater Emphasis
- DOTMLPF Innovation Vice Technological Innovation


JV2020 Compared to Today: Threat



Significant Disruption in the US Infrastructure Coinciding With Anti-Access Campaigns and Attacks on Targets Designed to Erode American Will




Numerous Asymmetric Attacks ...(i.e., Chem/Bio)



Selective Asymmetrical Advantage Over US

Aggressive Information Operations
And Manipulation of Media



JV2020 Compared to Today: Operational Environment




Figure 1 displays a series of 12 subplots arranged in a 3x4 grid, showing the evolution of the probability distribution $P(x)$ for different values of the parameter α . The subplots are labeled as follows:

- Top row: $\alpha = 0.0$, $\alpha = 0.2$, $\alpha = 0.4$
- Middle row: $\alpha = 0.6$, $\alpha = 0.8$, $\alpha = 1.0$
- Bottom row: $\alpha = 1.2$, $\alpha = 1.4$, $\alpha = 1.6$

The x-axis for all plots ranges from -10 to 10, and the y-axis ranges from 0 to 1.0. As α increases, the distribution becomes more peaked and narrower, centered around $x=0$.

Air Forces

Navy Forces

Army Forces

Marine Forces

Air Forces	Navy Forces
Army Forces	Marine Forces

ARMY FORCES

AIR FORCES

MARINE FORCES

NAVY FORCES


**Result: Full
Use of Service
Forces
Without
Conflicting**

Result: Full Spectrum Dominance Through Synergy of All Capabilities

JV2020 Compared to Today: Structure




- Continued Overseas Presence But Greater Focus on CONUS Based Power Projection
- Rapidly Deployable Expeditionary Joint Forces Projected in Balanced and Sustained Waves of Capability That Maximize the Service Core Competencies and Enable Forces to Fight While Deploying and on Arrival.
- Evolving Role of the National Guard & Reserves
 - κ Continued Reliance On Total Force For MTWs
 - κ Increased Role In Performing SSC Missions Vital to US Interests
 - κ Increased Role in Executing Shaping Missions Through Theater Engagement Plans
 - κ Key Role in Providing Military Support to Civil Authorities
 - ♦ WMD Crisis & Consequence Management, Homeland Security



Capability Comparison

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Equivalent Capability - Different Force Structure



RESULT: Integration of All Instruments and Capabilities of National Power Toward Accomplishing a Single Political-military Endstate.

Moving Toward The Joint Vision



- Established Joint Vision As The Common Goal Throughout DOD
 - κ Defense Planning Guidance
- Identified Future Challenges and Desired Operational Capabilities To Meet Challenges
- Joint Forces Command
 - κ Campaign Plans Focus on Robust Experimentation
- Implementation Master Plan
- Unified Command Plan 21 Vision
- The Interagency Piece
 - κ War Plan Annex/Interagency Working Group
- The Multinational Piece (Alliances/Coalitions/Bilaterals)

Conclusion

**This Vision Is Firmly Grounded In The
View That The Core Competencies Of
The Individual Services Must Be
Brought Together To Create A Truly**

**Joint Force Capable Of
FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE**

Transformation Planning Guidance (Excerpt attached)

In April, 2003 the Department of Defense published the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). The TPG provides the framework for the military to transition “from an industrial age to an information age military” It defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing military....through new combinations of concepts, Capabilities, people and organizations....

Copies of the TPG are available from Strategy & Analysis, and will provide today's leaders with an understanding of how the department of defense anticipates implementing the necessary changes to make JV2020 a reality.

The TPG identifies transformation as consisting of three parts.

1. Transformed culture through innovative leadership.
2. Transformed Processes--- Using future operating concepts
3. Transformed Capabilities through Force Transformation.

Within the aspect of Transformed capabilities there are four pillars that specifically speak to the impacts on the California National Guard. The four pillars are:

- Strengthening Joint Operations
- Exploiting US Intelligence Advantages
- Experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts
- Developing transformational capabilities.

The TPG is intended to “permit the Department to manage two major dilemmas that have stymied transformation progress in the past” Both of these dilemmas have implications for the CNG. The first dilemma is “the need to balance near-term operational risk against future risk in investment decisions (*Read where to put the bucks...*)... Because of limited resources this may mean making the difficult decision of foregoing currently planned systems and investing instead in capabilities that we believe will reduce future risk” We have seen this strategy manifest in the announcements that the Department is not going to invest in legacy equipment.


The second dilemma is to invest now in emerging technologies but yet “remain open to other paths towards transformation” (we must) “continue an iterative process of innovation and experimentation that permits new insights to guide future investment decisions”

“Implementation of the transformation strategy will shift us from an industrial age to an informational age military. Information age military forces will be less platform-centric and more network-centric.”

“The goal should be to produce military forces capable of the following type of operations by the end of the decade:

- (Item 1 of four) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters** will conduct effects-based, adaptive planning in response to contingencies, with the objective of defeating enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations”

This aspect of the TPG speaks directly to the role of the CNG. While we have traditionally accomplished these types of activities in response to natural and man-made disasters (all hazards events) in a state emergency role, at the national level, there is no visibility that the state headquarters routinely “conduct effects-based, adaptive planning in response to contingencies”. This mission has traditionally been done in an ad-hoc manner, meaning we “task organize” from existing Army and Air personnel and respond. By transforming to a “Standing Joint Force Headquarters” our federal mission, and manning models will prepare us for, and formalize our ability to respond to both federal and state missions.



TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE

APRIL
2003



3. Transformed Capabilities Through Force Transformation: The supporting strategy for force transformation, as defined in the 2001 QDR, rests on four pillars, which are further explained in succeeding sections of this document:
- 1) Strengthening joint operations
 - 2) Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages
 - 3) Experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts
 - 4) Developing transformational capabilities.

This strategy for transformation implementation will permit the Department to manage better the two major transformation dilemmas that have stymied transformation progress in the past, both of which arise from the need to invest scarce resources in transformation.

The first transformation dilemma is the need to balance near-term, operational risk against future risk in investment decisions. Postponing major investments in transformation while devoting the bulk of resources to reducing near term operational needs raises the risk of being overtaken by our adversaries. Progress in transforming military forces requires significant investments in those aspects of transformation that we are confident have enduring benefits. Because of limited resources, this may mean making the difficult decision of foregoing currently planned systems and investing instead in capabilities that we believe will reduce future risk.

The second transformation dilemma is the need to invest now in specific technologies and concepts that are deemed transformational, while remaining open to other paths towards transformation. To transform the force we must commit resources, yet remain detached enough from these commitments to continue an iterative process of innovation and experimentation that permits new insights to guide future investment decisions.

The Department's transformation strategy helps manage the tension between the need to remain open to new ideas and the need to foreclose some debate and invest in programs deemed critical to progress in transformation. It also allows the Department to better balance operational and future risk. The strategy does so through activities that build new capabilities now, permitting better execution of the new defense strategy, while exploring other capabilities essential for further transformation.

Implementation of the Department's force transformation strategy will shift us from an industrial age to an information age military. Information age military

forces will be less platform-centric and more network-centric. They will be able to distribute forces more widely by increasing information sharing via a secure network that provides actionable information at all levels of command. This, in turn, will create conditions for increased speed of command and opportunities for self-coordination across the battlespace. The first step toward forces with these attributes is to invest more now in the four transformation pillars. The goal should be to produce military forces capable of the following type of operations by the end of the decade:

- Standing joint force headquarters will conduct effects-based, adaptive planning in response to contingencies, with the objective of defeating enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations.
- U.S. forces will defeat the most potent of enemy anti-access and area denial capabilities through a combination of more robust contamination avoidance measures, mobile basing and priority time critical counterforce targeting.
- U.S. forces will leverage asymmetric advantages to the fullest extent possible, drawing upon unparalleled Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that provide joint common relevant operational situational awareness of the battlespace, rapid and robust sensor-to-shooter targeting, reachback and other necessary prerequisites for network-centric warfare.
- Combined arms forces armed with superior situational awareness will maneuver more easily around the battlefield and force the enemy to mass where precision engagement capabilities may be used to maximum effect.

Military forces with the ability to execute these types of operations will be better able to implement the new defense strategy and accomplish the six operational goals identified in the 2001 QDR:

1. Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and means of delivery will ensure our ability to generate forces in a timely manner without being deterred by adversary escalation options.
2. Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeating anti-access threats will enable us to preserve and utilize the most effective avenues of approach while rapidly engaging adversary forces.

Implementing the Four Pillars

Pillar One: Strengthening Joint Operations

Joint Concepts and Architectures

The key to the Department's transformation strategy is future joint operating concepts. They should be specific enough to permit identification and prioritization of transformation requirements inside the defense program. In order to avoid becoming a new orthodoxy that forecloses debate on promising new approaches to warfighting, the concepts will be updated as required by ongoing experimentation results and operational lessons learned. The CJCS will be responsible for oversight of production and annual validation of authoritative joint concepts in three timeframes:

- Near-term (2-3 years out) Joint Operations: Combatant Commander war plans, operational and training lessons learned, and joint doctrine, all designed to achieve new strategy goals and updated in accordance with the CPG, will promote transformation through enhanced jointness and planning modifications. Combatant Commanders will devise war plans taking into account mid-term joint operating concepts, lessons learned from ongoing operations, joint training and exercises, advanced concept technology demonstrations and experiments. Current war plans and joint doctrine will be the authoritative baseline against which joint training and experimental results will be measured to assess their transformational value.
- Mid-term (Just Beyond the FYDP) Joint Concepts: Future joint concepts will depict how the joint force of the future is to fight. They will address specific military operations across the range of military operations. They will be designed to meet the six operational goals established in the 2001 QDR. The CJCS, in coordination with Commander, JFCOM, will initially develop one overarching joint concept and direct the development of four subordinate joint operating concepts (JOC): homeland security, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and major combat operations (see tasking, appendix one). More guidance on the development of these concepts is provided in appendix four. The JOCs will evolve over time to reflect insights gained from experimentation. The transformation roadmaps will identify the desired operational capabilities needed to implement the JOCs and the preferred means of obtaining those capabilities. The Department will measure progress toward building these capabilities in the program/budget review.

- Linking Integrated Architectures to a Reformed Capabilities-Identification Process: Integrated architectures describe in greater detail the relationship between the tasks and activities that generate effects on enemy forces and supporting operations. They identify where operations intersect and overlap and they provide details on interoperability requirements. The architectures will include not just material solutions but also doctrine, organization, and training needs. Using these architectures, the JROC will be responsible for prioritization of capabilities based on their contribution to realization of the JOCs.
- Far-term (15-20 years out) Joint Vision: The current Joint Vision document will be modified and used as a long-range articulation of joint operations (see tasking, appendix one). It will provide a broad statement of desired future concepts and capabilities required for future operations. The Joint Vision also will provide the context for future joint and Service concept development and experimentation.

Other Jointness Initiatives and Interoperability Goals

The FY04-09 DPG directs the Department to strengthen joint operations through standing joint force headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint training transformation, and an expanded joint forces presence policy. Building on the DPG-directed interoperability study results, Commander, JFCOM will develop an integrated interoperability plan to address the following interoperability priorities (see tasking, appendix one):

1. Standard operating procedures and deployable joint command and control processes, organizations, and systems for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters;
2. A common relevant operational picture for joint forces;
3. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;
4. Selected sensor-to-shooter linkages prioritized by contribution to the joint operating concepts;
5. Reachback capabilities that provide global information access; and
6. Adaptive mission planning, rehearsal, and joint training linked with C4ISR.

Joint Operations Concepts (JROC Draft) (Excerpt attached)

The Department of Defense established a Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) to develop Joint Operations Concepts (JOC) for the US military to “describe how the Joint Force intends to operate 15-20 years from now”.

The JOC serves three purposes:

- “Provides the Operational context for the TRANSFORMATION for the Armed Forces of the United States...”
- “Provides the Conceptual framework to guide future Joint Operations...” and
- Provides the foundation for the development and acquisition of NEW CAPABILITIES through changes in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF)

Copies of the JOC are available from Strategy and Analysis upon request.

While the JOC provides considerable information, the reader is directed to a couple of key points. In the introduction section, (specifically Section 1D) the JOC identifies “One key tenet of the QDR and NMS is the development of a capabilities-based approach” Again, we see directives that the key for future development in all critical elements within the military (DOTMLPF) is based on generating capabilities.

In section 3 “the Future Joint Force: Attributes...” the JOC identifies “key attributes to achieve full spectrum dominance”. These attributes include:

- Fully Integrated: “Beyond de-confliction to fully integrated elements, with all functions and capabilities focused toward a unified purpose.”
- Expeditionary: “Rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace regardless of anti-access or area-denial environments and independent of existing infrastructure”
- Networked: “..linked and synchronized and near simultaneous dissemination to turn information into actions”
- Decentralized: “A Joint Force that leverages the power of interdependent joint capabilities while operating in a joint manner at lower echelons”
- Adaptable: “A Joint Force prepared to quickly respond to any contingency with the appropriate capabilities mix”
- Decision Superiority: “The state at which better-informed decisions are arrived at and implemented faster than an adversary can react..” (and)
- Lethality: “Increased and refined JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES to destroy and adversary and or the systems in all conditions and environments..”

This significant focus on both joint operations (fully integrated) and tailor-able (Expeditionary, networked, and adaptable) sends a strong signal that the structure and organizations of the California National Guard will be involved in the transition. The extent and direction of the transition will be driven in no small part by the ability to consider these Joint Operating Concepts in developing the organizational structure of both the Joint Force Headquarters and ultimately the deployable units (capabilities) of the California National Guard

SUMMARY:

The threat, the battlespace, and the environment in which the Department of Defense will be called upon to address in the future dramatically changed in the last decade. To be fully effective the department must be more agile, more responsive, more effective, and must be prepared to generate a wider range of capabilities with less notice than ever before.

To generate the agility and capabilities needed for the future will require all components within the department to work not in a de-conflicted manner, as was the case in the Air-Land Battle of the cold war, but in a fully integrated manner, that includes not only all components and all services, but integrates other agencies and other nations.

The Department of Defense has developed a roadmap that outlines the processes and actions that must be undertaken by all elements of the Department. The transition to JFHQ serves three major purposes. First, it aligns the state headquarters with our counterparts elsewhere in DoD. The transition ensures the parent services and DoD leadership understand of the role and responsibilities of the State HQ, because the functions and organization are supported by JV2020 doctrine. Second, it positions the state HQ to better shape the capabilities of the force structure assigned to the state. Finally, (and some would agree most importantly) organize the State Headquarters to accomplish the State Missions instead of consistently requiring "ad hoc" organization.

FINAL DRAFT

JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

JROC DRAFT



7 March 2003

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1.D. **Capabilities-Based Approach.**¹⁶ One key tenet of the QDR and NMS is the development of a capabilities-based approach. A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage joint forces or US interests.¹⁷ Development of a capabilities-based Joint Force requires a broad and long-term strategic perspective, a greater appreciation of the operational and strategic environmental factors and a rigorous analysis of the capabilities needed to achieve defense policy goals.

In the past, the construct for force development was requirements-driven based upon specific threats. However, the United States cannot predict with confidence the nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors that may pose threats to its interests, allies or friends. To mitigate the risk of this uncertainty, the United States must anticipate the range of broad capabilities that any adversary might employ and the necessary capabilities required to resolve any conflict or crisis. Thus, a capabilities-based approach shifts this construct from threat-based force development to force planning based on a set of desired capabilities for any given military operation. These desired capabilities are derived from a set of **joint operating concepts**, articulating how the future force will operate within specified segments of the range of military operations, and a set of **joint functional concepts** that articulate the desired capabilities within each functional area across the ROMO.

¹⁶ QDR 2001, 13.

32 swiftly defeat an adversary but are applicable to sustained combat, and the
33 potential simultaneous conduct of operations to reestablish order, stability,
334 and local governments.

335 The Joint Force must sustain itself in austere global regions by becoming
336 less dependent on existing infrastructure and using globally integrated and
337 synchronized end-to-end logistics and self-sustainment systems. This enables
338 the conduct of operations for a specified time without requiring an operational
339 pause. Finally, the Joint Force will remain committed to full coordination and
340 interoperability of capabilities with interagency and multinational partners to
341 ensure complementary effects.

342 **Section 3. The Future Joint Force: Attributes and How It Will Operate.**

3 The following describes attributes of the future Joint Force and broadly
344 explains how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.

345 **3.A. Joint Force Attributes.** The Joint Force must embody key attributes to
346 achieve full spectrum dominance:

347 **Fully Integrated.** The Joint Force must move beyond deconfliction to fully
348 integrated elements, with all functions and capabilities focused toward a
349 unified purpose. This means that the capabilities provided by the Services,
350 combatant commands and combat support agencies are born joint and fully
351 integrated²⁴ to provide a set of inherently interoperable and synergistic joint
352 capabilities to the JFC. Legacy equipment and systems will be "made joint" to
the extent possible until such time as replacement by "born joint" equipment

FINAL DRAFT

54 and systems is feasible. Full integration will require further expansion of the
55 “joint team mindset”²⁵ from the combatant command level where it exists today
356 down to the joint task force (JTF) and component headquarters (HQ).²⁶ An
357 increased degree of integration will also be required among appropriate Service
358 forces to conduct joint tactical actions at levels appropriate to the mission.
359 Joint training, more interoperable systems and the elimination of seams
360 between functional components will enhance this integration. For full
361 integration in the strategic, operational and tactical domains, greater
362 coordination and collaboration must also extend to the interagency and to
363 multinational partners.

364 **Expeditionary**²⁷ describes those elements of the Joint Force that are
5 rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global
366 battlespace regardless of anti-access, or area-denial environments²⁸ and
367 independent of existing infrastructure. Designated elements based in the
368 United States, abroad or forward deployed must be configured for immediate
369 employment and sustained operations in austere environments. These forces
370 must be capable of seamlessly transitioning to sustained operations as a crisis
371 or conflict develops.

²⁴ JW&CR White Paper, 22.

²⁵ Ibid., 11

²⁶ JTF headquarters may change significantly. This approach applies to whatever command and control element and/or structure may replace the current notion of a JTF. *Authors.*

²⁷ NSS, 30.

²⁸ QDR 2001, 30.